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A Preliminary Framework for Measuring Deference in Rights Reasoning 
 
Cora Chan* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Courts around the world have converged on three core principles for adjudicating human 
rights that are subject to a limitation clause. The first relates to the structure of the 
adjudication – the adoption of a two-stage approach in which courts initially ask whether 
there has been a prima facie limitation of rights (the rights definition stage) and then, if so, 
proceed to enquire whether that limitation was justified (the rights limitation stage). The 
second and third relate to the substantive principles that govern these two stages – at the 
rights definition stage, the adoption of a generous approach to defining rights, and at the 
limitation stage, the use of a proportionality test in evaluating the justifiability of a prima 
facie rights limitation. These principles form part of what Webber calls the “received 
approach” to the limitation of rights.1 A corollary of the adoption of these principles is the 
expansion of judicial powers. Definitional generosity has expanded the scope of 
governmental action that is subject to judicial scrutiny.
2
 Proportionality mandates a more 
stringent review than orthodox standards of review: the court does not merely assess the 
reasonableness of a decision, but whether it is necessary and balanced as well.
3
 This 
expansion of judicial oversight has led to concerns that, in adjudicating rights, courts may 
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intrude into policy issues that they lack the expertise or democratic legitimacy to decide.
4
 To 
allay these concerns, courts have sometimes deferred to legislative or executive judgments in 
reasoning whether an unjustified rights violation has occurred.
5
 The inception of a 
substantive doctrine that increases judicial supervision of rights has ironically paralleled the 
rise of an institutional doctrine – deference – that curbs that supervision.6 
The literature on judicial deference is voluminous.
7
 However, there is little discourse on 
the methodology for assessing how deferential judicial reasoning is in rights cases, and there 
has been no attempt to offer a comprehensive, systematic framework for making such 
assessments. This paper seeks to plug this gap by sketching out a basic framework for 
measuring deference in rights reasoning in common law jurisdictions.
8
  
The backbone of the proposed framework is the set of received principles of rights 
adjudication outlined above, and its applicability is conditional upon jurisdictions embracing 
those principles. The principles are applied most often to qualified rights, i.e., rights that are 
subject to limitation, and the focus of this paper is on these rights.
9
 There are various 
proportionality formulae, and the versions used in this paper are the commonly-used four-
limb test, which asks whether a rights limitation 1) pursues a sufficiently important aim, 2) is 
rationally connected to that aim, 3) is no more than necessary to achieve the aim, and 4) 
strikes a fair balance between the individual right and public interest,
10
 and the three-limb 
test, which asks the first three questions.
11
 Where illustrations are needed, the paper draws 
upon cases from Canada, Israel, the UK – which adopt the four-limb test – and Hong Kong – 
which adopt the three-limb test.  
This initiative to measure deference may be questioned on a number of grounds. First, 
deference is difficult to quantify. The objection goes that it is hard to identify objective 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. infra notes 21-23, 46. 
5
 See e.g. infra notes 17-20, 38-44, 48-49, 57-61, 64-70, 72, 76. 
6
 Cf. Julian Rivers, Proportionality and Variable Intensity of Review, 65 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 174 (2006) 
7
 See e.g. infra notes 21-23, 46. 
8
 The framework is designed for common law jurisdictions. Owing to differences in inter alia judicial traditions, 
evidentiary rules and the nature of judicial decision-making between common and civil law jurisdictions, 
assumptions that hold in the former may not do so in the latter. 
9
  Non-qualified rights include those are subject to exceptions (limited rights) and those that are subject neither 
to exceptions nor to limitations (absolute rights). The proposed framework is equally applicable to these rights if 
the jurisdiction being examined subjects them to the aforementioned received principles of rights adjudication as 
well.  
10
 e.g. R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 [71] (“Oakes”). The formula that asks whether a measure is suitable, 
necessary and proportionate stricto sensu for achieving a legitimate purpose, adopted in Germany and by the 
European Court of Justice, in essence asks the same questions, and can be analyzed in the same way as the four-
limb formula suggested here. However, the framework is not intended to be applicable to civil law jurisdictions. 
11
 e.g. de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing [1999] 1 AC 
69. 
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indicators of deference in a court’s reasoning process that would permit quantification. Valid 
assessments of how deferential a judge is must turn on qualitative interpretations of the 
judge’s reasoning.12 My reply is that it is possible to elicit observable indicators of deference 
from the structure of rights reasoning provided by the aforementioned principles of rights 
adjudication, as I endeavour to show herein. Those indicators will provide the basis for 
quantification. This paper acknowledges that ascertaining deferential attitudes requires close 
analysis of judicial reasoning. It is not my intention to argue that the proposed framework can 
supplant such analysis. On the contrary, it is precisely my intention to incorporate qualitative 
evaluations of judicial reasoning within a quantitative framework. 
That intention, an opponent might aver, leads to another problem: qualitative 
assessments open up room for subjective evaluation and will likely reduce the inter-rater 
reliability of studies based on the framework. My reply is that, first, a study’s reliability can 
be enhanced by developing, and then making transparent, a specific coding protocol that 
fleshes out the rules underlying the qualitative judgments.
13
 Later in the paper I elaborate 
upon the framework’s qualitative criterion. Second, even if a study based on the framework is 
not perfectly reliable – and no empirical study ever can be – its findings can still be of value 
if readers are informed of its reliability. To test that reliability, researchers could, for 
example, perform a double-blind coding procedure on a representative sample of cases.
14
 
Readers could then be informed of the convergence rate, which suggests the reliability of the 
overall study. Finally, one way of ensuring the integrity of studies that incorporate qualitative 
criteria is for researchers to make known the reasoning underlying their qualitative judgments 
to allow “others [to] check the extent to which she has drawn acceptable conclusions from the 
evidence.”15 All of these measures can be taken to safeguard the integrity of studies based on 
the proposed framework and make transparent the reliability of those studies. 
A disclaimer is in place. The proposed methodology can be used to determine how 
deferential courts are. Such descriptive findings on their own make no normative claim 
concerning whether courts are deferring to an appropriate degree, although they do provide 
the empirical basis for making normative appraisals. 
                                                 
12
 cf. Caprice L. Roberts, In Search of Judicial Activism: Dangers in Quantifying the Qualitative, 74 TENNESSEE 
LAW REVIEW 567 (2007). 
13
 cf. Lee Epstein and Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69(1) THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 1 
(2002); Lee Epstein and Andrew D Martin, Quantitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH (Peter Cane & Herbert M Kritzer eds, 2010). 
14
 ibid. 
15
 Lisa Webley, Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH, supra note 13, at 935. 
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
4 
 
In the remainder of the paper, I first define the focal parameter of deference. Next, I put 
forward a methodology for measuring it, followed by demonstration of how the proposed 
framework can be applied in a quantitative study. Throughout the paper, “government” is 
used to refer to the executive or legislative branch. 
 
2. Defining deference 
 
Deference, in its broadest sense, refers to the latitude that courts afford the government for 
making decisions. Defined in this way, there can be many parameters to deference, such as 
deference in case outcomes (by upholding a government decision) or deference in the 
formulation of remedies (by handing down a remedy that affords the government room to 
refashion polices). The parameter of interest in this paper is deference in the court’s 
reasoning process about the merits of an issue. This is a crucial parameter. Rights 
adjudication often demands courts to determine contested questions of fact, such as the 
security threat posed by allowing a given individual to enter the country, as well as to make 
value judgments, such as whether animal welfare is more important than the freedom of fox 
hunters.
16
 When faced with empirical or normative uncertainty, it is common for courts to 
give leeway to the government in considering these issues on the ground that it has more 
expertise or democratic legitimacy. Typically, this involves lowering the legal standard that 
the government must satisfy. In the recent UK Supreme Court case of Tigere,
17
 the barring of 
foreign students who were de facto settled in the UK from obtaining student loans was 
challenged for violating their right to education. Lords Sumption and Reed, in dissent, held 
that because the court lacked the institutional competence to assess socio-economic policies, 
it would attenuate every limb of the proportionality test by adding the lens of “manifestly 
without reasonable foundation.”18 Sometimes the courts grant leeway by giving weight to the 
government’s factual or normative assessments. In Animal Defenders International,19 for 
example, the blanket ban on political advertising on television and radio was challenged for 
violating freedom of expression. Lord Bingham did not dilute the proportionality formula but 
was relaxed in assessing its third and fourth limbs. He did not explore the possibility that a 
                                                 
16
 For an exposition of the types of uncertainty that courts face in rights adjudication, see A.D.P. BRADY, 
PROPORTIONALITY AND DEFERENCE UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT: AN INSTITUTIONALLY SENSITIVE 
APPROACH (2012).  
17
 R (on the application of Tigere) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] UKSC 57. 
18
 [77]-[100]. 
19
 R (on the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport 
[2008] UKHL 15. 
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less extensive ban could be equally effective and did not explain why the benefits of the 
measure outweighed the heavy interference with political expression. Instead, he held that 
“great weight” had to be attached to the judgment of democratically elected politicians on 
such issues.
20
  
A proper approach to affording latitude to the government in reasoning about rights is 
key to maintaining the proper boundaries of power between the legislature and executive on 
the one hand, and the judiciary on the other. If excessive latitude is granted, the courts fall 
foul of their constitutional role in protecting rights. If, in contrast, insufficient latitude is 
granted, they exceed their institutional and constitutional remit. It is therefore unsurprising 
that the affording of latitude has been a prime focus of contemporary debates on judicial 
deference. Scholars have analyzed the extent of judicial deference in rights reasoning,
21
 
evaluated whether courts’ approach to deference is appropriate22 and proposed how courts 
should exercise deference.
23
 In the post-Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) UK, there have been 
discussions of whether the court exercises “due deference”, understood as affording 
appropriate weight to the government’s views.24 However, before one can evaluate whether 
courts have been deferring to an appropriate degree, one first needs to ascertain the degree to 
which they have been deferring. This paper facilitates investigation of the latter question by 
proposing a framework for measuring how deferential a court is in its reasoning concerning a 
rights issue. 
                                                 
20
 [31]-[33]. 
21
 See e.g. K.D. Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act, PUBLIC LAW 829 (2004); Adam Tomkins, 
National Security and the Role of the Court: a Changed Landscape? LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 543 (2010). See 
also KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE 108-109 & 
ch 9 (2001); Kent Roach, Judicial activism in the Supreme Court of Canada, in JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN COMMON 
LAW SUPREME COURTS 77 (Brice Dickson ed., 2007). 
22
 See e.g. note 23 and Richard A. Edwards, Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act, 65(6) MODERN 
LAW REVIEW 859 (2002).  
23
 See e.g. BRADY, supra note 16; Rivers, supra note 6; T.R.S. Allan, Human Rights and Judicial Review: A 
Critique of “Due Deference”, 65 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 671 (2006); Aileen Kavanagh, Defending 
Deference in Public Law and Constitutional Theory, 126 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 222 (2010); T.R.S. Allan, 
Judicial Deference and Judicial Review: Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory, 127 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 96 
(2011); Murray Hunt, Sovereignty’s Blight: Why Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of “Due 
Deference”, in PUBLIC LAW IN A MULTI-LAYERED CONSTITUTION 337 (N Bamforth & P Leyland eds, 2003); 
Jeffrey Jowell, Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity? PUBLIC LAW 592 (2003); Alison 
L. Young, In Defence of Due Deference, 72(4) MODERN LAW REVIEW 554 (2009); AILEEN KAVANAGH, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS ACT part II (2009); Jeff King, Institutional 
Approaches to Judicial Restraint, 28(3) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 409 (2008); Mark Elliott, 
Proportionality and Deference: the Importance of a Structured Approach, in EFFECTIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW: A 
CORNERSTONE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE (Christopher Forsyth, Mark Elliott, Swati Jhaveri, Anne Scully-Hill & 
Michael Ramsden eds,  2010). 
24
 See e.g. Hunt, Kavanagh, Young, supra note 23. 
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There is an abundance of quantitative empirical analysis of the flipside of deference – 
judicial activism – particularly in US and Canadian scholarship.25 Quantification models have 
been proposed to measure such parameters of activism as case outcomes, the extent to which 
courts expand their jurisdiction by lifting jurisdictional hurdles, rule on issues of substantive 
policy as opposed to issues concerning the democratic process, and depart from the text or 
intentions of drafters of the constitution, and whether they exercise broad remedial powers.
26
 
Scholars posit that the greater the extent of intervention in these respects, the more activist 
the court is. All of these parameters and the corresponding methodologies used to measure 
them are relevant to an understanding of judicial attitudes in rights cases, and it is not my aim 
to evaluate them. I wish only to emphasize that the measurement of judicial deference in the 
reasoning process over the merits of a rights case has received little attention in comparison. 
That is not to say that nothing has been said on the subject. Two studies provide ideas on 
how deference in rights reasoning may be measured. In a study on the use of proportionality 
by courts in the UK, Germany, France and Spain and the European Court of Human Rights in 
mediating conflicts between rights and security, Goold, Lazarus and Swiney use a 
quantitative framework that codes inter alia whether those courts have applied a 
proportionality test or only a broad-brush balancing test, as well as the outcomes of 
judgments – taken as a proxy for how “forgiving” the courts are of the governments’ 
arguments on proportionality.
27
 In addition, the researchers study a number of cases 
qualitatively to ascertain the rigour of the courts’ proportionality analyses.28 Their key 
                                                 
25
 In addition to the sources listed in note 26, other leading works in the US and Canada that propose or apply 
quantitative methodologies include: William P. Marshall, Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 
73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1217 (2002); Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 1139 (2002); Sujit Choudhry and Claire E. Hunter, Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court 
of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v NAPE, 48 MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 525 (2003); 
Christopher P. Manfredi and James B. Kelly, Misrepresenting the Supreme Court’s Record? A Comment on 
Sujit Choudhry and Claire E Hunter, “Measuring Judicial Activism on the Supreme Court of Canada”, 49 
MCGILL LAW JOURNAL 741 (2004); Keenan Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial Activism”, 
92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004); Robert M. Howard and Jeffrey A. Segal, A Preference for Deference? The 
Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57(1) POLITICAL RESEARCH QUARTERLY 131 (2004). For a quantitative 
analysis of substantive judicial review in the US and UK, see Eric Ip, Taking a “Hard Look” at “Irrationality”: 
Substantive Review of Administrative Discretion in the US and UK Supreme Courts, 34 OXFORD JOURNAL OF 
LEGAL STUDIES 481 (2014). 
26
 This categorization draws on Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of Judicial Activism, in 
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (Stephen C Halpern & Charles M Lamb eds, 1982); Margit 
Cohn & Mordechai Kremnitzer, Judicial Activism: A Multidimensional Model, XVIII No. 2 CANADIAN 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 333 (July 2005); STEFANIE A LINDQUIST & FRANK B CROSS, 
MEASURING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2009). 
27
 B. GOOLD, L. LAZARUS AND G. SWINEY, PUBLIC PROTECTION, PROPORTIONALITY, AND THE SEARCH FOR 
BALANCE 1-3, 20 (Ministry of Justice Research Series 10/07, September 2007).  
28
 See, e.g., ibid at 3, 28-29, 33, 35, 48. 
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findings include:
29
 that proportionality, as opposed to mere balancing, is applied most often 
in Spain, followed by France, and least often in the UK. The UK also seems relatively 
forgiving of the government in its proportionality analysis, judging from the government’s 
relatively high win rate in proportionality cases before the House of Lords. Moreover, the 
qualitative analyses reveals significant variations in the rigour with which proportionality was 
applied across jurisdictions, ranging from the most rigorous four-limb analysis to a focus on 
just one or two limbs of the test. 
Another relevant study is Davidov and Reichman’s quantitative examination of the 
Supreme Court of Israel’s deference to military decisions.30 The researchers record inter alia 
the percentage of petitions based on proportionality arguments (as opposed to the less 
searching ultra vires ground), case outcomes in certain contexts, and the degree to which the 
courts employed deferential rhetoric.
31
 They find that the court has become less deferential 
over time: proportionality arguments have been deployed more frequently, the rejection rates 
of petitions in which the military commander appears before the court has declined, and the 
use of deferential “catch-phrases” has fallen.32 
Both of the foregoing studies are instructive. The major insights from Goold et al are 
that: 1) the four-part structure of the proportionality test is an important contributor to the 
rigour of judicial scrutiny, as a four-limb inquiry is more rigorous than a focus on just one or 
two limbs or collapsing the test into a mere balancing test; and 2) in applying the 
proportionality test, courts may be more or less forgiving of the government’s arguments. 
Davidov and Reichman’s study reinforces the contribution of proportionality inquiry to the 
rigour of judicial scrutiny. However, while drawing inspiration from these two studies, this 
paper seeks to avoid the pitfalls of their methodologies. In particular, I depart from these 
authors by giving less prominence to case outcomes. This is because outcomes do not 
accurately reflect the degree of deference in the court’s reasoning process,33 which is the 
focus of this paper. A court that upholds a government decision is not necessarily 
accommodative of the government; it may be that the government simply has a very strong 
case. I also depart from Davidov and Reichman’s methodology in not relying on judicial 
                                                 
29
 Ibid at ii, 20, 48. 
30
 Guy Davidov & Amnon Reichman, Prolonged Armed Conflict and Diminished Deference to the Military: 
Lessons from Israel, 35(4) LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY 919 (2010). 
31 
Ibid at 933-934. 
32
 Ibid at 942-946. 
33
 The limitations of quantitative studies of judicial activism that are purely outcome-based are well-
documented. See e.g. Randy E. Barnett, Is the Rehnquist Court an “Activist Court” The Commerce Clause 
Cases, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1275, 1280 (2002); Roberts, supra note 12, at 601; Aziz Huq, When was Judicial 
Self-Restraint? 100 CAL.L.REV. 590 (2012). 
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rhetoric as an indicator of deference, since it is not uncommon to see a mismatch between the 
approach to deference pronounced by a court and that actually adopted in practice.  
From this point onwards, unless otherwise stated, “defer” is used to denote deference in 
a court’s reasoning process over the merits of the government’s case. 
 
3. Proposed framework 
 
The received principles of rights adjudication outlined at the beginning of the paper give the 
structure of judicial reasoning in qualified rights cases a predictable core. Whenever an 
unjustified rights violation is alleged, the court first needs to define the scope of the right in 
question and then apply that definition to the facts to determine whether the litigant’s acts are 
protected by the right. If the answer is in the affirmative, the court then needs to assess 
whether the rights limitation passes the various stages of the proportionality test. This fixed 
core structure of rights reasoning presents the court with a number of opportunities to afford 
the government leeway.  
First, at the rights definition stage, the court may afford latitude by giving weight to the 
government’s definition of the right or its application of the definition to the facts. There is 
no opportunity for the court to defer by relaxing the demands of proof on the government 
because at this stage the burden of proof is on the litigant rather than the government. 
Then, at the rights limitation stage, how much leeway the government has depends on 
how insistent the court is that the government bears the burden of justification, how heavy the 
court determines that burden to be, and how ready the court is to accept that the government 
has discharged its burden.
34
 Corresponding opportunities for deference can be identified. For 
example, the court may grant latitude to the government by shifting the burden of 
justification: requiring the litigant to show that a measure is unjustified rather than the 
government to show that it is justified. Even when the justificatory burden is on the 
government, however, the court may grant it leeway by lightening that burden. The heaviness 
of that burden is controlled by the standard of justification the government has to meet, which 
comprises two elements. The first is the standard of review – the question of law the 
government must prove to pass constitutional muster. The court can insist on a measure 
                                                 
34
 Cf. Mark Elliott, From Bifurcation to Calibration: Twin-track Deference and the Culture of Justification, 
in THE SCOPE AND INTENSITY OF SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW: TRAVERSING TAGGART’S RAINBOW 70-71 (Hanna 
Wilberg & Mark Elliott eds, 2015).  
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passing the most rigorous four-part proportionality test or can dilute or skip some stages of 
the test.  
Nevertheless, proportionality is a question of law, the resolution of which sometimes 
depends on assessments of fact. Hence, even when the standard of review is fixed, the court 
can still lighten the government’s justificatory burden by lowering the standard of proof on 
questions of fact, which is the second element constituting the standard of justification. For 
example, the court may require that the government merely show that the attainment of an 
aim by a measure is not a mere theoretical possibility, or that it is supported by some 
evidential basis, rather than prove a question of fact to a fair degree of certainty (e.g., on a 
balance of probabilities).  
Finally, in assessing whether the requisite standards of review and proof have been 
satisfied, the court may relax the degree of cogency of arguments required of the government 
in such satisfaction. To understand this form of deference, a distinction must be drawn 
between first-order reasons (or reasons on the merits) and second-order reasons.
35
 The former 
relate to the legal merits of the case in question, whereas the latter are concerns of, say, 
institutional competence and democratic legitimacy, which are unrelated to the merits of the 
case but act as “reweighting reasons”.36 If a court defers for second-order reasons, it is 
treating the government’s case as stronger than what the court, on its own balance of first-
order reasons, considers it to be.
37
  
In determining whether an impugned measure satisfies the proportionality test, courts 
may require the government to produce cogent first-order reasons for every argument on 
proportionality. Or they may accept the government’s conclusions on proportionality without 
probing the reasoning behind them, on the basis of second-order considerations. Hence, there 
were instances in which the government was unable to proffer sufficient first-order reasons to 
justify the proportionality of a measure (e.g., when it concealed crucial evidence from the 
court on security grounds), but the court chose to trust its assessments anyway on the basis 
that it possessed expertise, intelligence information or democratic legitimacy that the court 
lacked. In these instances, the courts attached great weight to the government’s first-order 
arguments on the basis of second-order considerations, that is, they were willing to accept 
that the requisite standard of review (say, a four-part proportionality test) and standard of 
                                                 
35
 Kavanagh, Defending Deference, supra note 23, at 230; Stephen Perry, Second-Order Reasons, Uncertainty 
and Legal Theory, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 913 (1988-89); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS ch.1 
(1975); [anonymized]. 
36
 Kavanagh, Defending Deference, supra note 23, at 223, 233; Perry, ibid, at 932; [anonymized]. 
37
 Perry, ibid; Kavanagh, Defending Deference, ibid; [anonymized]. 
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proof (say, on a balance of probabilities) could be discharged by relatively little first-order 
justification. 
The presence of these opportunities, or what I call strategies, of deference – 1) rights 
definition, 2) standard of justification comprising a) the standard of review and b) standard of 
proof, 3) burden of justification and 4) cogency of arguments – can be illustrated by the 
Supreme Court of Canada’s judgment in Edwards Books.38 In this case, a Sunday closing law 
was challenged for violating the freedom of religion and conscience of shopkeepers whose 
faiths observed another day as a day of rest. The court first had to define the scope of the 
freedom of religion: when would restrictions on the practice of a religion constitute 
interference with such freedom? It then had to apply that definition to the facts: did the 
burden on shopkeepers imposed by the impugned law amount to interference with their 
freedom of religion? The first strategy of deference was available to the court. It could give 
weight to the legal test proposed by the government for determining when a burden amounted 
to interference with the right in question, or to the way in which it had applied that test to the 
facts. Dickson CJ (on whose judgment I focus here) did not utilize this opportunity. He 
reasoned that non-trivial indirect burdens did constitute such interference, and, applying that 
reasoning to the facts, found that the law imposed a burden on Saturday observers that was 
not insignificant.
39
 He did not accept the government’s approach to applying the right to the 
facts, which treated the alleged burden as a creation of the religion itself rather than of the 
law.
40
 Having found that there was a prima facie limitation of religious freedom, the court 
then had to decide whether the law was proportionate. Here, the remaining strategies of 
deference were available to it. It could defer by shifting the burden of justification at one or 
more stages of the proportionality test onto the litigant, an option it rejected.
41
 The court 
could also loosen the justificatory standard by lowering the standard of proof, but it insisted 
on proof on a balance of probabilities.
42
 However, the court did loosen the standard of review 
on the third limb of the proportionality test. Rather than require the government to show that 
the law as drafted was the least intrusive measure, Dickson CJ required only that it show that 
the measure abridged the right in question “as little as is reasonably possible.”43 The court 
also relaxed the cogency of first-order arguments required from the government to 
demonstrate that the measure struck a fair balance. The court did not explain how the benefits 
                                                 
38
 R v Edwards Books and Art Limited [1986] 2 SCR713. 
39
 752-768. 
40
 763-768. 
41
 768-783. 
42
 768-783. 
43
 772, 779, 781-782. 
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of the law outweighed the harms. Instead it trusted the government’s judgment on the basis of 
second-order reasons, that is, that the legislature was constitutionally entitled to draw the line 
by preferring a particular scope of exemption, and that “a serious effort” had been made to 
accommodate the freedoms of Saturday observers.
44
 
It is not my contention that the above-cited opportunities/strategies for deference exhaust 
the available avenues for granting the government leeway in rights reasoning. Rather, they 
can be considered central to rights adjudication because they arise in a typical case in which 
both the rights definition and limitation stages are applicable.
45
 The ubiquity and prominence 
of these strategies is evidenced by scholars’ frequent reference to them when discussing 
deference in rights reasoning.
46
 It is possible to analyze deference by assessing how far the 
courts make use of these opportunities for deference. 
Conceptually, the two components of the standard of justification – standard of review 
and standard of proof – are distinct, and can thus be counted as two separate strategies of 
deference within a framework for measuring deference, culminating in five rather than four 
strategies. In practice, however, it is often not possible to distinguish between a court’s 
relaxation of the standard of review and that of the standard of proof.
47
 In Sinclair Collis,
48
 
for example, a ban on tobacco vending machines was challenged before the English Court of 
Appeal for violating the right to non-deprivation of property. Recognizing that there was 
inconclusive evidence over whether the ban would lead to a reduction in under-age smoking, 
Arden LJ held that the court should not require a “definite link between the evidence and the 
risk”: there was “no need for the court to investigate the scientific evidence,” and, as a 
corollary, the various limbs of the proportionality test should be filtered through the lens of 
                                                 
44
 777-783. 
45
 Barring cases with particular circumstances that render a deference strategy inapplicable, such as those 
identified in Section 3.3.  
46
 Rights definition: Young, supra note 23, at 555. Edwards, supra note 22, at 870-871. Standard of review 
and cogency of arguments: Young, supra note 23, at 555; Elliott, supra note 23, at 269; Alison L. Young, Will 
You, Won’t You, Will You Join the Deference Dance? 34(2) OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 375, 389-390 
(2014); [anonymized]; Edwards, supra n 22, at 872-882; Ewing, supra note 21, at 847; PAUL CRAIG, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 616-675 (2012); ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra note 21, at ch 9; KIRSTY 
MCLEAN, CONSTITUTIONAL DEFERENCE, COURTS AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA 144-145 
(2009) at 144-145; Janneke Gerards, Pluralism, Deference and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine, 17(1) 
EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL 80 (2011),  at 88. Standard of proof: Sujit Choudhry, So What is the Real Legacy of 
Oakes? Two Decades of Proportionality Analysis under the Canadian Charter’s Section 1, 34 SUPREME COURT 
LAW REVIEW 501 (2006); Young, supra note 46, at 389-390; ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL, supra 
note 21, at 161, 173; [anonymized]. Burden of justification: Gerards, supra note 46, at 88; Julian Rivers, The 
Presumption of Proportionality, 77(3) MODERN LAW REVIEW 409 (2014); [anonymized]. 
47
 Scholars too do not always distinguish between the two concepts. See e.g. Elliott, supra note 34, at 79-80. 
48
 R (Sinclair Collis Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWCA Civ 437.  
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“manifest inappropriateness.”49 This could be interpreted as a dilution of the standard of 
review or as lowering of the standard of proof. 
The practical difficulty of distinguishing a court’s use of particular components of the 
standard of justification strategy poses problems for coding them separately in an empirical 
study. Hence, although the components are conceptually distinct, considering them as one 
strategy – the standard of justification – facilitates reliable coding on each strategy. This can 
be accomplished by specifying the most rigorous standard of justification as the four- or 
three-limb proportionality test (as appropriate) with questions of fact on each limb to be 
proved on a balance of probabilities, and having the degree of deviation from that standard to 
be determined by the number of limbs in which the standard is diluted (Section 3.1 will 
further explain this). This approach does not require researchers to ascertain whether that 
dilution occurred in the standard of review or standard of proof (which, as we have seen, can 
be difficult to determine), but only which stages of the proportionality test have been diluted, 
a relatively straightforward task.  
Although the imperative to count the standards of review and proof as a single strategy is 
practical, the combination is theoretically sound as well. These standards together determine 
the threshold that a government case needs to meet to withstand judicial scrutiny. The 
concept of the standard of justification represents how heavy the justificatory burden is, 
whereas the cogency of arguments represents how ready the court is to accept that that 
burden has been discharged.
50
 
The proposed framework thus relies on four strategies of deference. A court can make 
use of more or fewer of such strategies, and can be more or less deferential in each. The 
framework takes into account both the quantity of strategies used and the intensity with which 
each is used, in measuring the extent to which a court has used the available strategies. It 
ranks each applicable strategy along a triadic ordinal scale: not deferential (ND), moderately 
deferential (MD) and highly deferential (HD). The ND category represents the most exacting 
form of judicial review on a particular strategy that can be expected of courts in jurisdictions 
that adopt the received principles of rights adjudication. How deferential a court is depends 
on how far it deviates from this baseline of non-deferential behaviour. HD represents those 
cases in which the review on a strategy is so lenient that the essence of review on the strategy 
is lost, and its scrutinizing force is significantly weakened. The MD category falls somewhere 
                                                 
49
 [116]-[180]. 
50 
Cf. Elliott, supra note 34, at 79-80, who called deference on the former question “intrinsic deference” and that 
on the latter, “adjudicative deference”.  
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
13 
 
in between the ND and HD categories, encompassing situations in which the form of review 
has been relaxed to an extent that it becomes clearly different from the most exacting form of 
review on that strategy, but not to the extent that it has been stripped of meaningful 
scrutinizing force.  
The ordinal categories are delineated by the criteria in the following section. The unit of 
analysis is each judge’s analysis of each rights issue within a case. The concepts of the 
applicability of a strategy of deference and of a stage of the proportionality test, referred to in 
the criteria, are elaborated upon in Section 3.3.  
   
3.1 Delineation of ordinal categories 
 
Rights definition 
 
A unit of analysis is categorized as ND if the judge either rejects the government’s definition 
of the right in question and its application of that definition to the facts, or accepts the 
definition and application but gives sufficient justification on the merits on why the 
government’s position is preferred. 
The concept of “sufficient justification on the merits” (or sufficient first-order 
justification), which is also used in the indicia for the strategy of “cogency of arguments,” 
requires explanation. This concept imports qualitative judgments into the methodological 
framework. The court will be considered to have given sufficient first-order justification for 
accepting the government’s position if it has offered a reasonable explanation of why the 
government’s argument is stronger than the litigant’s on the merits. In terms of form, an 
explanation need not address every issue raised by the parties to be deemed reasonable, but it 
must address all essential issues that divide the parties and explain why the government’s 
case fares better.
51
 In terms of substance, a reasonable explanation is one that is logical, is 
formulated in accordance with objective standards with legal authority (arguments based 
purely on personal preferences or prejudice clearly do not qualify as such) and is reasonably 
justifiable by the constitutional values of the jurisdiction being examined.
52
 The last-
                                                 
51
 Cf. the requirements of the duty to give reasons at common law. See infra note 87. 
52
 See David Feldman, Human Rights, terrorism and risk: the roles of politicians and judges, Public Law 364, 
374-375 [2006]. Cf. the idea of public reason: JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM  (2005); Kumm, The Idea 
of Socratic Contestation, supra note 2. See also David Dyzenhaus, Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s 
Conception of Legal Culture, 14 SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS 11 (1998); Dyzenhaus, Hunt and 
Taggart, The Principle of Legality in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation, 1 
OXFORD UNIVERSITY COMMONWEALTH LAW JOURNAL 5 (2001).  
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mentioned values can be ascertained from, among other sources, the text and purpose of the 
constitutional documents, and will vary across jurisdictions. I return to the issue of cross-
jurisdiction variance below.  
A researcher need not be convinced that the court’s reasons for accepting the 
government’s position are correct (or justified) to find its justification sufficient; s/he need 
only find that the reasons are justifiable, i.e., that they could reasonably be considered a 
product of sound legal reasoning. A researcher may verify whether a given justification could 
reasonably be accepted by asking whether it has addressed obvious counterarguments to the 
government’s position. For example, assume that a Muslim student in the UK complains that 
a mixed-faith school’s total ban on the wearing of religious symbols violates her freedom of 
religion, and the school retorts that the ban does not prima facie limit such freedom. The 
student’s case appears plausible because wearing religious symbols is a manifestation of her 
faith. If the court accepts the school’s conclusion without any explanation, then obvious gaps 
in the school’s case are left unaddressed, and the court’s explanation (or lack thereof) cannot 
plausibly be defended as adequate. On the other hand, if the court accepts the school’s 
position but explains how the school accommodates the other religious practices of the 
student involved and why she can choose to attend a comparable school in the neighbourhood 
that allows the wearing of religious symbols, then the court’s attempt at justification can be 
considered reasonable.  
First-order justification need not be the same as empirical evidence; it can include 
arguments based on common sense as well.
53
 If an argument of the government is truly 
common-sensical, and hence self-explanatory, the court need not labour in explaining its 
reasons for accepting it. This brings me back to my earlier point about the context sensitivity 
of the concept of reasonableness: what constitutes sufficient explanation depends on the 
legal, political, social and cultural context in which the issue is being examined. In Hong 
Kong, for example, it is common knowledge that land and housing are scarce and that there is 
a need to guard against the abuse of public housing resources. A court that accepts these 
propositions without explanation can still be considered to have given sufficient justification 
for that acceptance.
54
 However, the propositions may not be self-explanatory and may require 
explication in another jurisdiction. Similarly, whether a reading of a right is reasonable 
depends on the wording of the text, constitutional values and accepted canons of 
                                                 
53
 For a helpful discussion of this point, see BARAK supra note 1, 308-312. For an analysis on the standard of 
proof and nature of evidence required of the government, see Choudhry, supra note 46. 
54
 See e.g. Chim Sui Ping v Hong Kong Housing Authority [2012] HKCFI 1427 at [5], [55]-[60]. 
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interpretation, which may differ across jurisdictions. Hence, while it is possible to state at a 
general level the kinds of reasons that are acceptable (e.g. rationality, reference to objective 
legal standards and constitutional values), what those reasons require by way of justification 
depends on the context. A fair assessment of whether a court’s attempt at justification is 
reasonable requires researchers to have an understanding of and sensitivity toward the legal, 
political, social and cultural environment in which the issues are being decided.  
To continue with the elaboration of the ordinal categories on rights definition, a unit of 
analysis is categorized as MD if the judge accepts either the government’s definition of the 
right or its application of the definition to the facts without giving sufficient justification on 
the merits as to why the government’s position is preferred. In these situations, review at the 
rights definition stage has been weakened but can still play some meaningful scrutinizing 
role. 
A unit is categorized as HD if the judge accepts both the government’s definition of the 
right and its application of the definition without giving sufficient justification on the merits 
as to why the government’s position is preferred. In these instances, scrutiny at the rights 
definition stage has been significantly slashed. 
Where discussions of either the definition of a right or that definition’s application are 
not applicable in the case in question, a unit of analysis is considered ND if the judge rejects, 
or accepts with sufficient first-order justification, the government’s definition or application 
thereof (whichever is applicable), and HD if the judge accepts that definition or application 
(whichever is applicable) without such justification. There is no MD category in this instance. 
The ND category can be illustrated by the UK Supreme Court’s judgment in In re 
Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (“In re Medical Costs”).55 A bill that sought to recover, 
in certain circumstances, from employers and insurers (“compensators”) the costs incurred by 
the government in treating victims of asbestos was challenged as infringing the 
compensators’ right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. There was no dispute that an 
increase of financial burden constituted deprivation of property; the sole issue was whether 
the bill increased the financial burden of the compensators. On this question the court 
rejected a number of scenarios sketched by the government that would render the insurers’ 
financial position unchanged, as well as the government’s argument that the bill had no 
impact on “the balance sheet of the insurer.”56 Because only the rights application component 
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 In re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill [2015] UKSC 3. 
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 [37]-[43]. 
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of this strategy of deference is applicable, the court’s non-attenuation of review on that 
component renders the unit ND on this strategy. 
The MD category can be illustrated by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance’s 
judgment in Chau Tsun Kiu.
57
 Certain legislative provisions allow a candidate standing for 
election to include promotional materials of other candidates in the same constituency in 
postage-free letters. The applicant was a candidate who held minority political views. He 
argued that the practical effect of the provisions was that candidates who were affiliated with 
other candidates could enjoy more subsidized exposure than those who were not. Hence, the 
provisions were indirectly discriminatory on the status of non-association with other political 
parties and candidates. Both the legal test for finding differential treatment and the 
application of that test were at issue, and the court accepted the government’s views on both. 
On the former, the court did not explain the high threshold it had adopted for finding prima 
facie discrimination: an effective causal link between the ground of discrimination and the 
discriminatory effects was required to establish indirect discrimination.
58
 The court did not 
explain how the high threshold for finding indirect discrimination was reconcilable with the 
entrenched generous approach to defining fundamental rights. However, in applying the high 
threshold to the facts, the court offered adequate explanation for accepting the government’s 
position: the direct cause of the applicant’s disadvantaged position was other candidates’ 
refusal to promote him, “not the reasons behind the refusal”.59 Since the court accepted the 
government’s arguments on one component of the rights definition strategy without giving 
sufficient justification on the merits, it is coded MD on this strategy. 
Finally, the UK House of Lords’ judgment in Gillan60 illustrates the HD category. There 
was no dispute that interference with private life had to reach a certain threshold to engage 
the right to privacy. At issue was whether the government’s authorization for stop and search 
powers deprived persons of privacy to an extent that reached that threshold. Lords Bingham 
and Scott’s judgments contained scant explanation of why these powers could “scarcely be 
said to reach” that threshold.61 Since only the application of definition component was 
applicable, the court’s lack of sufficient justification on that component renders the strategy 
of rights definition HD. 
 
                                                 
57
 Chau Tsun Kiu v Secretary for Justice [2014] HKCFI 1694. 
58
 [40]-[41]. 
59
 [51]-[54]. 
60
 R (on the application of Gillan) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12. 
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Standard of justification 
 
A unit is categorized as ND if the judge subjects the rights limitation to all applicable stages 
of the multi-limb proportionality test and requires proof of facts at each stage on a balance of 
probabilities.
62
 Whether the three- or four-limb test should be adopted as the maximum 
standard of justification depends on which formulation is accepted as a principle of 
constitutional rights adjudication in the jurisdiction involved. An example of ND is Lady 
Hale’s judgment in Tigere, which refused to heed the government’s request to dilute the 
proportionality test for adjudicating the right to education, and instead insisted on applying 
the most rigorous four-limb test.
63
  
A unit is categorized as MD if the judge dilutes the standard at one stage of the 
proportionality test. Such dilution blunts the proportionality test, although the diluted 
standard can still play a meaningful scrutinizing role. Dilution occurs often at the third limb. 
In Edwards Books, for example, the minimal impairment limb was diluted to a question of 
whether the measure was reasonably necessary.
64
  
A unit is categorized as HD if the judge dilutes the standard at more than one stage of the 
proportionality test or skips one or more stages. The former occurred in In re Medical Costs, 
where Lord Mance diluted the first to third limbs with the “manifestly without reasonable 
foundation” lens.65 The latter occurred in Gillan. In assessing whether the stop and search 
powers were proportionate, Lord Scott collapsed the proportionality inquiry into a single test 
of fair balance.
66
  
Note that a limb of the proportionality test is considered to have been analyzed by the 
court (i.e., not skipped) if the court pronounces it as a legal test, makes a ruling on it or 
analyzes it, regardless of the quality of the analysis. The latter issue is dealt with in the 
“cogency of arguments” section. 
If only one or two limbs of the proportionality test are applicable, then a unit is 
categorized as ND if the court goes through the applicable limb(s), requiring proof of facts on 
                                                 
62
 The balance of probabilities, rather than a higher standard of, for instance, beyond reasonable doubt or 
absolute certainty, is set for the ND category because it is unrealistic to expect even a rigorous court to generally 
require a proposition of fact in rights cases to be proved to a standard higher than a balance of probabilities. This 
civil standard is expressly adopted in Canada and Israel for rights adjudication, and impliedly adopted in the UK 
through the use of such phrases as proof “on balance”. Israel: CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd v Migdal 
Cooperative Village [1995] IsrLR 1. Canada: Oakes, at 105. UK: F v G [2012] I.C.R. 246 at [48]; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v AF [2007] EWHC 651 (Admin) at [65].  
63
 [27]-[42]. 
64
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a balance of probabilities, and as HD if the court dilutes the standard at, or skips, any of those 
limb(s). There is no MD category in these instances. 
 
Burden of justification 
 
A unit of analysis is categorized as ND if the judge insists on the government bearing the 
burden of justification at every stage of the proportionality test asked. Gillan, Tigere, Animal 
Defenders International and In re Medical Costs are all examples of the burden of 
justification remaining with the government throughout the proportionality test.  
If the judge reverses the burden of justification at one stage of the proportionality 
analysis, the unit is coded MD. The demands of proof on the government are clearly 
lightened, although the burden of justification can still serve some meaningful function 
because the burden on the other proportionality limbs remains with the government. An 
example of MD is Sinclair Collis. Rather than ask the government to demonstrate that the ban 
in question was no more than necessary, Arden LJ required the claimant to come up with a 
case of a proposed alternative being equally effective.
67
  
If the judge reverses the burden at more than one stage, the government’s onus is 
substantially lightened, and the unit is coded HD. This was the case in British 
Telecommunications.
68
 The applicants challenged certain legislative provisions regulating 
online copyright infringement on the ground that they violated the rights to privacy and 
freedom of expression. The English High Court diluted the third limb to a question of 
whether there was a “clearly less intrusive but equally effective means of pursuing the aim” 
and the fourth to whether the provisions proceeded on an “obviously flawed assumption”.69 
In applying this diluted proportionality test, the court shifted the burden of justification on the 
whole test onto the litigant: “it is essential not to lose sight of what ultimately a claimant 
needs to show, namely, that the impugned legislative measure is not proportionate, in other 
words, that the legislator unlawfully failed to balance the relevant interests at stake, bearing 
in mind that, for the reasons already given, the court in this type of case, involving economic 
interests and/or the weighing on competing rights, is likely to accord the legislator a wide 
area of discretionary judgment.”70 
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 British Telecommunications Plc, Talktalk Telecom Group Plc v The Secretary of State for Business, 
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If only one or two limbs of a proportionality inquiry are asked (because the judge 
attenuates the standard of justification or the other limbs are inapplicable), a unit is 
categorized as ND if the judge insists on the government bearing the onus of justification on 
the limb(s) asked, and as HD if the judge reverses the onus on any of them. There is no MD 
category in this case. 
 
Cogency of arguments 
 
In the framework’s final strategy of deference, a unit of analysis is categorized as ND if the 
judge rejects, or accepts with sufficient first-order justification given, the government’s 
arguments concerning proportionality. A unit is considered MD if the judge accepts those 
arguments at one stage of the proportionality analysis without giving sufficient first-order 
justification. The ND and MD categories can be illustrated by Lady Hale’s judgment and the 
dissenting judgment in Tigere, respectively. Lady Hale intensely scrutinized all four stages of 
proportionality. She explained why focusing resources on those students who were likely to 
remain in and contribute to the UK after their education was a legitimate aim. She then 
considered whether the bright-line exclusionary rule was rationally connected to that aim and 
no more than necessary, and came to the conclusion that it could be more narrowly tailored. 
Finally, she reasoned that the harm done to the important right to education outweighed the 
administrative convenience of the bright-line rule and the short-term savings to the public 
purse.
71
 The dissenting judges, in applying the diluted “manifestly without reasonable 
foundation” standard, explained with sufficient justification why the rule did not manifestly 
lack a legitimate aim or rational connection and why the proposed alternatives were not real 
alternatives. However, on the question of whether the rule was imbalanced overall, they 
offered no first-order explanation, relying instead on second-order grounds: that it was 
important to respect the line drawn by democratically elected representatives.
72
 
When the judge accepts the government’s arguments at more than one stage without 
giving sufficient first-order justification, the unit is considered HD. Lord Bingham’s analysis 
in Animal Defenders International, discussed earlier,
73
 is an example of this category.  
To avoid the double-counting of deference on the “standard of justification” and 
“cogency of arguments” strategies, the cogency of arguments is measured in relation to the 
standard of justification adopted by the court. If the court has diluted that standard, the 
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cogency of arguments is measured in relation to the diluted standard. In Sinclair Collis, for 
example, Arden LJ’s judgment is coded HD for the standard of justification because she 
skipped the fourth limb of the proportionality test and diluted the first three limbs with the 
lens of “manifest inappropriateness”. However, the cogency of arguments is coded ND 
because she explained why the evidence adduced by the government showing inter alia the 
percentage of young smokers accessing tobacco from vending machines and the 
ineffectiveness of the voluntary code designed to reduce the number of under-age sales by the 
machines demonstrated that the measure was not manifestly inappropriate.
74
 Likewise, in In 
re Medical Costs, the standard of justification is coded HD because the first three limbs of the 
proportionality test was diluted to “manifestly without reasonable foundation”, but the 
cogency of arguments is coded ND because the court carefully scrutinized the government’s 
arguments and found the measure manifestly unreasonable and imbalanced.
75
  
Further, when only one or two limbs of the proportionality inquiry are asked, a unit is 
categorized as ND if the judge rejects, or accepts with sufficient first-order justification 
given, the government’s arguments on those limb(s), and as HD if the judge accepts them on 
any of those limb(s) without giving sufficient first-order justification. There is no MD 
category in this case. An example of HD in this situation is Gillan, in which Lord Scott, in 
assessing the single question of fair balance, offered no first-order reason for why the 
limitation was outweighed by the benefits of the measure: what went onto the “other side of 
the scale” (the side with the benefits) depended on the government’s concealed evidence, 
which he presumed to be trustworthy.
76
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Table I. Summary of indicia delineating ordinal categories 
 
STRATEGY OF 
EXERCISING DEFERENCE 
ORDINAL LEVELS OF DEFERENCE  
ND  MD  HD  
Rights definition 
 
Rejecting, or accepting with 
sufficient justification on 
the merits given, 
government’s definition of 
right and application of  
definition  
 
Accepting government’s 
definition of right OR 
application of definition 
without giving sufficient 
justification on the merits 
 
Accepting government’s 
definition of right AND 
application of definition 
without giving sufficient 
justification on the merits 
 
Rights definition (if 
discussions of either 
definition or its 
application are 
inapplicable) 
 
Rejecting, or accepting with 
sufficient justification on the 
merits given, government’s 
definition of right or 
application of definition 
(whichever is applicable) 
 
N/A Accepting government’s 
definition of right or 
application of definition 
(whichever is applicable) 
without giving sufficient 
justification on the merits 
Standard of justification 
 
Going through every 
applicable stage of the 
three- or four-limb 
proportionality test, 
requiring proof of facts on a 
balance of probabilities 
 
Diluting standard at one 
stage of the proportionality 
test 
 
- Skipping one or more 
stages of the 
proportionality test; OR 
- Diluting standard at more 
than one stage of the 
proportionality test 
 
Standard of justification 
(if only one or two stages 
of the proportionality test 
are applicable) 
 
Going through the 
applicable stage(s) of the 
proportionality  test, 
requiring proof of facts on a 
balance of probabilities 
 
N/A Diluting standard at, or 
skipping, any of the 
applicable stage(s) of the 
proportionality test 
Burden of justification 
 
Insisting on government 
bearing burden of justifying 
every stage of the 
proportionality test asked   
 
Reversing burden of 
justification on one stage 
of the proportionality test 
 
 
Reversing burden of 
justification on more than 
one stage of the 
proportionality test 
 
Burden of justification (if 
only one or two stages of 
the proportionality test are 
asked) 
 
Insisting on government 
bearing burden of justifying 
the stage(s) of 
proportionality asked 
 
N/A Reversing burden of 
justification on any of the 
stage(s) of proportionality 
asked 
Cogency of arguments 
  
Rejecting, or accepting with 
sufficient justification on 
the merits given, 
government’s arguments at 
every applicable stage of 
the proportionality test 
 
Accepting government’s 
arguments at one stage of 
the proportionality test 
without giving sufficient 
justification on the merits 
 
Accepting government’s 
arguments at more than one 
stage of the proportionality 
test without giving sufficient 
justification on the merits 
 
Cogency of arguments (if 
only one or two stages of 
the proportionality test are 
asked) 
 
Rejecting, or accepting with 
sufficient justification on the 
merits given, government’s 
arguments on the stage(s) of 
proportionality asked 
N/A Accepting government’s 
arguments on any of the 
stage(s) of proportionality 
asked without giving 
sufficient justification on the 
merits  
 
 
  
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
22 
 
3.2 Three conditions and a proviso 
 
It has been noted that the proposed framework is applicable only to jurisdictions that adopt 
the received principles of rights adjudication set out in the Introduction. In this section I 
highlight three additional conditions for the framework’s applicability. The first is that the 
various limbs of the proportionality test adopted in the jurisdiction in question must play a 
roughly equally important role in the proportionality analysis, such that, for instance, it would 
be justified to treat the skipping of one limb as equally deferential to the skipping of another. 
The four-limb proportionality formula (and hence, also the three-limb formula that covers the 
first three limbs) used in this paper meet this condition. Each limb serves a distinct and 
important purpose in safeguarding the constitutional legitimacy of a rights limitation.
77
 This 
claim may be challenged on the ground that the third and fourth limbs of the four-limb 
formula encompass the second and first limbs, respectively. If a measure is no more than 
necessary for achieving an aim, it would undoubtedly be rationally connected to that aim. If 
the measure is balanced overall, then its aim would undoubtedly be legitimate. The objection 
goes that the first and second limbs are, at best, less important than the other two limbs and, 
at worst, redundant. 
It is true that the third and fourth limbs of the proportionality test are broad inquiries that 
can encompass the first two limbs. However, the four-part structure breaks down these broad 
inquiries into smaller questions, each with a different focus.
78
 The first focuses on screening 
out aims that are illegitimate in a democracy or insufficiently important to override rights, 
whereas the fourth focuses on whether the benefit from achieving a legitimate aim outweighs 
the harm to the right. The second limb focuses on whether the means chosen can achieve the 
aim, and the third on whether there are less intrusive means that could also do so. The four-
part structure compels public authorities to demonstrably justify a rights limitation on all four 
fronts. The first two parts serve as crucial hurdles in ensuring the justifiability of a rights 
limitation. The highest courts of both Canada and Hong Kong have found measures that 
treated sexual minorities differently in lack of a legitimate aim.
79
 The Supreme Court of 
Israel held in Ressler v Knesset that a law postponing military service for those devoting their 
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lives to the study of the Torah failed to achieve its purported objectives.
80
 The first two stages 
of the proportionality test are part and parcel of, as Kumm puts it, a structure for contestation 
that remedies several “pathologies” that may infect democracies, including “thoughtlessness 
based on tradition, convention or preference”, consideration of illegitimate reasons that 
exceed the bounds of public reason, and the invocation of “government hyperbole or 
ideology” which may yield measures that are “not appropriately tailored to engage the 
realities on the ground.”81  
I therefore consider the four sub-tests of proportionality to be equally important and do 
not distinguish them for the purpose of measuring deference. However, the fact that an 
analysis on the third and fourth limbs may encompass an analysis on the first two has 
implications for the methodology of determining whether the first two limbs have been 
skipped. According to the coding principle stated at page 17 above, the second limb can be 
considered to have been skipped only if it is not asked as a legal test and there is no ruling or 
analysis concerning it. If a court does not examine the second limb separately, researchers 
will need to assess a court’s analysis on the third limb to determine whether the second limb 
has been skipped. Because analysis of the third limb may encompass comparing the degree of 
achievement of an aim by the original measure and that by a proposed alternative, a court’s 
analysis of the third limb may already include some analysis of the second, although, of 
course, in examining the third limb, a court may also only discuss whether the alternative can 
achieve the aim without assessing whether the selected means can do so. The same applies to 
determining whether the first limb has been skipped. If an analysis of the legitimacy of an 
aim is subsumed into analysis of the fourth limb, the first is not considered to have been 
skipped. The application of this coding principle is illustrated by the Hong Kong Court of 
First Instance’s judgment in Chan Hau Man Christina.82 Here, the police’s prohibition on the 
applicant demonstrating in a particular area was challenged for violating her freedom of 
expression. The court did not separately ask whether the prohibition was rationally connected 
to the objective of maintaining public order but, in analyzing whether it was no more than 
necessary, it reasoned that the means chosen were able to achieve that aim. The second limb 
is thus not considered to have been skipped.  
The two other conditions for the applicability of the proposed framework are that it is 
applicable only to jurisdictions i) in which the courts are expected to clearly detail their 
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reasons in rights judgments and ii) in which judges are generally capable, professional and 
impartial. The framework assumes that if a court does not elaborate its reasoning in 
upholding a rights limitation, it is acting deferentially. Imagine that a court merely states that 
a ban on wearing religious symbols in a mixed-faith school is “proportionate” without giving 
any reasons. Under my proposals, this court, which fails to expressly reason through the 
multi-part proportionality test, is considered to have attenuated the standard of justification 
and cogency of arguments required of the government, and is hence deemed deferential. 
However, there may be other reasons why a court may not elaborate its reasoning. It may 
simply be non-communicative. The judicial culture may be such that the courts are not in the 
habit of giving detailed reasons for their decisions. Thus, an opponent might argue, the 
proposed proxies for deference (e.g., assessing whether the court expressly goes through the 
multi-stage proportionality test and communicates first-order justification) may not be valid 
measures of the concept of deference, defined as giving the government leeway by, say, 
affording weight to the government’s arguments. 
This is a powerful objection. My reply is that in jurisdictions in which courts are 
expected and have the ability to openly explain why a rights limitation should prevail, and in 
which judges are generally capable and impartial, it is justified to assume that a court that 
flouts the justificatory expectation is acting deferentially. First, it is widely recognized that 
the spread of proportionality is concomitant with a shift in culture: from one of authority to 
one of justification.
83
 Legitimate state action is defined by reason rather than authority. In 
jurisdictions in which the demands of justification are made not just on governmental 
authorities but on courts as well, a court that fails to transparently explain why a burden on 
rights should be maintained reinforces the ethos of authority: the litigant must succumb 
because of the say-so of the public authority and the court. Such a court can then make no 
complaint if its lack of open justification is interpreted by the public as conveying a message 
of deference to authority. 
Second, when the said conditions hold, it is plausible to assume that a court that does not 
expressly justify a rights limitation is acting deferentially. Possible explanations for its 
opacity include: 1) the court has plenty of first-order justifications for upholding the 
limitation, but is too reticent to explain them in its judgment; 2) the court is incapable of 
formulating or articulating its first-order justifications; 3) the court is acting on irrational 
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grounds such as prejudice against the litigant; and 4) the court is deferential, i.e., it may or 
may not have first-order justifications for upholding the rights limitation, but in any case 
would like to grant the government leeway on the basis of second-order considerations of 
democratic legitimacy or expertise, and hence does not openly or intensely scrutinize the 
first-order arguments against the legal benchmarks.
84
 
The first explanation cannot be ruled out, but its possibility is discounted in 
environments in which judges are under formal or informal pressure to detail its reasons. The 
second and third explanations are unlikely in jurisdictions in which judges are by and large 
professional, legally competent and fair-minded. The fourth seems the most plausible. It is 
conceivable that courts that do not openly assess the strength of a government’s first-order 
case are acting on the basis of second-order institutional or constitutional considerations. 
Nevertheless, because the first three explanations cannot be entirely ruled out, a proviso 
needs to be introduced into the framework: the proposed proxies should stand unless there is 
clear evidence that the court’s lack of justification in a particular unit of analysis is due to 
non-deferential reasons such as those stated in 1), 2) and 3) above, in which case the unit 
should be discounted from the study. In jurisdictions that meet the stated conditions, such 
evidence will be rare (if existent at all). Absent such evidence, it is safe to assume that in 
these jurisdictions courts that fail to openly justify the upholding of a rights limitation are 
acting deferentially. 
Whether judges in a particular jurisdiction are generally capable and professional, and 
whether there is a constitutional expectation that judges expressly reason through a rights 
limitation, are empirical questions. A non-conclusive indicator of whether these conditions 
are satisfied are the criteria for the appointment and performance appraisal of judges in the 
jurisdiction being examined. In the UK, for instance, these criteria, which are set out by the 
Judicial Appointments Commission, include fairness and independence of mind, integrity, 
outstanding legal competence, and the ability to give reasoned decisions.
85
 With regard to a 
judicial justificatory culture, a strong indicator would be the remarks made by judges 
themselves (writing judicially or extra-judicially) on the need for judicial transparency and 
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open justice. Such remarks are prevalent in common law jurisdictions.
86
 There is also a well-
established tradition in these jurisdictions of the courts detailing the reasons for their 
decisions, with some jurisdictions even going so far as to impose a general duty to give 
reasons on the courts.
87
 Another indicator is judicial practice. If courts in a particular 
jurisdiction by and large attempt to detail the reasons for their rights decisions, a justificatory 
culture among the judiciary seems to prevail. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
comprehensively assess whether particular jurisdictions satisfy the conditions regarding a 
judicial justificatory culture and the quality of judges. I will only state that the conditions are 
without doubt satisfied in the jurisdictions that have been cited to illustrate the framework, 
and are likely to be satisfied in other common law jurisdictions that adopt the received 
principles of rights adjudication.  
 
3.3 Applicability of deference strategies and stages of proportionality test 
 
A stage of proportionality or strategy of exercising deference is considered applicable if it is 
feasible to ascertain a judge’s deferential attitude in that particular stage or strategy in the 
given unit of analysis. Whether it is possible to ascertain deferential attitude on a specific 
strategy depends on the norms of adjudication in the jurisdiction under examination. For 
instance, the obligation to comply with vertical or horizontal stare decisis may be stronger in 
one legal system than another. Therefore there can be no universal criteria for determining 
when a strategy is applicable. In general, however, researchers can consider adopting the 
following criteria. 
 
Strategy of deference not at issue and not discussed 
 
If a strategy for exercising deference or a component thereof is not an issue between the 
parties and the court does not discuss it as a result, then it is deemed inapplicable. For 
instance, in British Telecommunications, Sinclair Collis, Tigere and Animal Defenders 
International, the “rights definition” strategy is considered inapplicable because there was no 
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issue that there had been a prima facie rights limitation and the definition stage was not 
analyzed as a result. 
However, if the court proceeds to analyze a strategy of deference or a component thereof 
that is not at issue, then that analysis enables us to ascertain deferential attitudes, and the 
strategy or component becomes applicable. The paradigm case relates to the applicability of 
the second to fourth strategies of deference. Even if the parties in question agree on the 
standard and burden of justification and cogency of arguments required of the government, 
these means of deference are normally still considered applicable because the courts still have 
to apply – and hence discuss – them, making it possible to ascertain the court’s deferential 
attitude with respect to each. 
 
Court lacks control over strategy of deference 
 
The exemplar of this type of case is where stare decisis is at work. Insofar as non-final 
national courts are concerned, if courts higher in the national hierarchy have unequivocally 
determined that a certain standard of justification must apply in relation to the kind of case in 
question, or have handed down a definition of the right or relevant principle for applying that 
definition, then the “standard of justification” strategy or relevant component of “rights 
definition” is not generally considered applicable. The situation may differ when national 
supreme courts are involved because these courts may have the discretion to depart from their 
own decisions. If that is the case, even if the highest court previously handed down a standard 
of justification or definition of the right at issue, those strategies of deference should still be 
considered applicable in subsequent cases heard by that court.
88
 
It must be noted that in no jurisdiction is stare decisis entirely rigid. These are broad 
guidelines only, and what ultimately counts is whether courts have control over a strategy of 
deference as a matter of fact. For instance, if in a particular case a lower court does deviate 
from the standard of justification handed down by a superior court (say, by watering down 
that standard), then it becomes possible to ascertain the former’s deferential attitude on the 
standard of justification, and this strategy can be considered applicable. 
 
Strategy of deference or stage of proportionality makes no difference and is not discussed 
                                                 
88
 A related situation is when national courts are under the influence of supranational courts. If the former are 
bound to follow the rulings of the latter, then the aforementioned position in relation to non-final national courts 
applies. Yet if national courts are not bound to follow the rulings of a supranational court, then the position 
outlined in relation to supreme courts applies. 
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
28 
 
 
If a resolution on a strategy of deference or stage of proportionality analysis can in no way 
affect the way in which a rights issue will be decided, and the court does not discuss it as a 
result, then the strategy or stage in question is not applicable. If, however, the court proceeds 
to discuss a strategy of deference or stage of the proportionality test that will not affect the 
resolution of the case, that discussion allows us to ascertain deferential attitudes, and it makes 
sense to consider the strategy or limb applicable. A good example of the latter situation is 
when a court discusses all limbs of the proportionality test despite finding against the 
government on sequentially earlier limbs. In that case, all limbs of the test can be considered 
applicable. Another is when the court takes the view that there has been no prima facie rights 
limitation, but nevertheless proceeds to discuss whether the measure in question was justified. 
It would then be appropriate to consider the strategies of deference at the limitation stage 
applicable. 
 
Stage of proportionality test not relevant 
 
This occurs when the court reverses the burden of justification. The strategy of “cogency of 
arguments” examines how much evidence the court requires the government to proffer to 
prove its case. If the court shifts the onus of proof at some stages of the proportionality test 
onto the litigant, those stages become irrelevant to the discussion on cogency, as in British 
Telecommunications (in relation to all stages of the proportionality test) and Sinclair Collis 
(in relation to the third stage). It thus makes sense to treat those stages of proportionality at 
which the burden of justification is reversed as inapplicable for the “cogency of arguments” 
strategy. 
 
3.4 From qualitative to quantitative 
 
As discussed thus far, the proposed framework can be used to guide qualitative assessments 
of the degree of deference. Quantitative analysis becomes possible after weights have been 
assigned to the strategies of deference, values have been assigned to the ordinal levels, and 
the formula for calculating deference has been set. 
Admittedly, the assignment of weights and values is a major challenge in constructing a 
template for quantifying deference. My aim here is simply to suggest how such assignment 
can be approached and to outline a prima facie case for certain weights and values. I do not 
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
29 
 
seek to argue that the proposed weights and values are definitive. However, until a better case 
is made for alternative values and weights, I believe the proposed ascription should stand. 
The weights of the four strategies of deference should be determined according to their 
relative contribution to judicial deference in rights reasoning, whereas the values assigned to 
the ND, MD and HD categories should reflect the intensity of deference of that category. The 
assignment of weights and values thus hinges on judgments concerning the relative 
importance of the deference strategies and the deferential levels of the ordinal categories. The 
relevant perspective from which these judgments should be made is that of a jurist trying to 
understand the phenomenon of deference in judicial reasoning, not that of the litigating 
parties. This is because most, if not all, litigating parties are concerned only with the outcome 
of a case, and it would thus be difficult for them to think purely in terms of the intensity of 
judicial scrutiny.  
To assess the relative contribution of the four strategies of judicial deference, we need to 
compare, from a jurist’s point of view, the impact of 1) deference on each strategy exercised 
to roughly the same degree on 2) the overall level of deference in that unit of study, other 
things being equal.
89
 If strategy A is more important than strategy B, then deference on 
strategy A leads to a higher level of overall deference than deference to the same extent on 
strategy B. Another consideration for the determination of weights is the relative importance 
of the definition stage and limitation stage in rights adjudication. 
Applying these considerations to the four strategies, I believe that all four should be 
assigned equal weights. Hence, where all four strategies are applicable, they should count 
equally. If equal weights are assigned, then the rights limitation stage (which contains three 
strategies) carries more weight than the rights definition stage (which contains only one 
strategy). This may seem counter-intuitive at first glance. However, the rights limitation stage 
is widely considered a much more important part of rights adjudication than the definition 
stage. As mentioned earlier, a principle of rights adjudication that has been received globally 
is definitional generosity. An upshot of this generosity is that the analysis on limitation has 
taken centre stage in rights adjudication.
90
 It is in line with that focus to assign greater weight 
to the limitation stage. 
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This still begs the questions of why the rights limitation stage should be given three times 
the weight of the definition stage and why the three strategies at the rights limitation stage 
should count equally. The answers boil down to a judgment that the impact on deference of 
loosening the review on each strategy to the same extent is roughly the same. Compare the 
impact on deferential reasoning in the four situations below, in which deference is dialed to 
the maximum on each strategy. To hold other factors constant, assume that the identified 
strategy is the only applicable strategy in each situation.
91
 
1) A court that is highly deferential at the rights definition stage, accepting the 
government’s definition of the right and its application of the definition without 
giving sufficient justification. 
2) A court that is highly deferential on the standard of justification, collapsing the multi-
part proportionality test into a single test of whether the measure is manifestly 
unreasonable. 
3) A court that is highly deferential on the burden of justification, requiring the applicant 
to show that a rights limitation is unjustified. 
4) A court that is highly deferential on the cogency of arguments, deferring to the 
government’s judgment that a rights limitation is justified on second-order grounds. 
 
None of these situations seems definitively more deferential than another. If a jurist were 
asked to choose one or more situations that is more (or less) deferential than another, s/he 
would likely be indifferent. In all four situations, review of the government’s act operates at a 
minimal level. All four strategies thus have equal potential to switch the court’s scrutiny to 
minimal mode.  I therefore propose to weight the four strategies equally. 
  Moving on to the assignment of values, ND and HD represent the least and most 
deferential categories of review, respectively. An obvious option is to assign them the values 
of 0 and 1, respectively. The more difficult question is the value that should be assigned to 
MD. To reiterate what the MD category represents: situations in which the form of review 
has been attenuated to an extent that it becomes manifestly different from the most exacting 
form of review on that strategy, but not to the extent that it has been stripped of meaningful 
scrutinizing force. In other words, this category is neither very close to ND nor very close to 
HD. But is it a little closer to ND or to HD and, if so, by how much? This is where our 
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cognitive abilities run out. In principle, the scale of deference can admit infinite preciseness. 
It could run on a continuum of points between 0 and 1, with an interval of 0.1, or on an even 
finer scale with an interval of 0.05, or even finer still. In an ideal world we would know 
exactly what type of scrutiny falls into each fine-grained category. In the real world, 
however, owing to epistemic limitations, we are able to only crudely distinguish levels of 
deference, lest the criteria become too difficult to apply and judgments become arbitrary.
92
 
The proposed triadic model is a crude scale. MD, as defined, is distinct from ND and HD by 
a clear distance; it is more or less half way to HD. Under epistemic constraints, it is sensible 
to assign MD a mid-point value of 0.5. 
The values of 0, 0.5 and 1 are approximations of the intensity of deference. As such, the 
numerical values can function as a heuristic device for illustrating relative levels of 
deference, but they cannot be used to make comparisons with mathematical precision.
93
 For 
example, the framework does not allow us to conclude that judge X is 3.56 times more 
deferential than judge Y. However, this is not really a concern because mathematical 
precision is meaningless in this context. What we want to ascertain, and what can be revealed 
by a framework using approximate figures, are relative measures of deference, e.g., the 
relative impact of various factors on the level of deference, to determine whether particular 
judges, courts or periods attract more deference than others. The sensitivity analyses in 
Section 4 demonstrate that these relative measures are unlikely to change much with slight 
alterations in the values. The lack of numerical precision is not a problem because we do not 
need that level of precision to usefully analyze deference. 
After weights and values have been assigned, the proposed framework can generate two 
sets of basic scores: i) a strategy of deference score for each applicable strategy (this score 
will be 0, 0.5 or 1) and ii) a unit deference score that presents the overall level of deference in 
a unit of analysis. Two ways of calculating the latter score have been considered. The first is 
to simply add up the deference scores for each applicable strategy. The second is to take the 
average, i.e., to add the scores for each applicable strategy and divide the total score by the 
number of applicable strategies. I propose to adopt the second method because the number of 
strategies of deference available to the courts, which differs across units of analysis, should 
not be correlated to the level of deference. Suppose that in both units A and B, rights 
definition is not an issue. For unit A, all three strategies at the rights limitation stage are 
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applicable, whereas for unit B, only two strategies are applicable because the court is bound 
by a higher court on the standard of justification. Assume that for both units, the court is 
highly deferential on all available strategies. If only the sum of the strategy scores were 
considered, then unit A, which has a sum of 3, would appear to be more deferential than unit 
B, which has a sum of 2. That would give a misleading impression. Unit A should not be 
considered more deferential simply because more strategies of deference happen to be 
available to it. The taking of an average accommodates the diverging number of applicable 
strategies in rights cases by measuring the extent to which courts make use of the 
opportunities for deference available to them. 
 
4. Illustrations 
We are now in a position to see how the quantitative framework can be applied. Table II pulls 
together the deference scores of the UK units of analysis that have been discussed thus far, 
with the most deferential unit at the top. The rationale behind the coding has been explained 
above. 
Table II. Deference scores on selected cases 
UNIT OF ANALYSIS: CASE/COURT/JUDGE/RIGHT STRATEGY OF EXERCISING 
DEFERENCE 
UNIT 
DEFERENCE 
SCORE DOR SOJ BOJ COA 
British Telecommunications v The Secretary of State for 
Business, Innovation and Skill /HC/Parker J/Freedom of 
expression & right to privacy
94
  
- 1 1 - 1 
Gillan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis/HL/ 
Lord Scott/Right to privacy 
95
 
 
1 1 0 1 0.75 
Sinclair Collis Ltd v Secretary of State for Health/CA/ Arden 
LJ/Right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions
96
 
 
- 1 0.5 0 0.5 
Tigere v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills/SC/Lords Sumption and Reed/Right to education
97
 
 
- 1 0 0.5 0.5 
Animal Defenders International v Secretary of State for 
Culture, Media and Sport/HL/Lord Bingham/Freedom of 
expression
98
 
- 0 0 1 0.33 
In re Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases 
(Wales) Bill/SC/Lord Mance/Right to peaceful enjoyment of 
possessions
99
 
0 1 0 0 0.25 
Tigere v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and 
Skills/SC/Lady Hale/Right to education
100
 
 
- 0 0 0 0 
                                                 
94
 Supra text to notes 68-70 and pp 18, 26, 28. 
95
 Supra text to notes 60-61, 66, 76 and p 17. 
96
 Supra text to notes 48-49, 67, 74 and pp 26-28. 
97
 Supra text to notes 17-18 and pp 17, 26. 
98
 Supra text to notes 19-20, 73 and pp 17, 26. 
99
 Supra text to notes 55-56, 65, 75 and p 18.  
100
 Supra text to notes 63, 71 and pp 17, 26. 
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
33 
 
DOR: Definition of right; SOJ: Standard of justification; BOJ: Burden of justification; COA: Cogency of 
arguments. HC: High Court; CA: Court of Appeal; HL: House of Lords; SC: Supreme Court. ‘–’ denotes “not 
applicable”. 
 
These illustrative findings demonstrate the proposed framework’s ability to expose the multi-
faceted nature of deference and broaden our perspective in appraising it. As can be seen from 
the table, a unit may score HD on one strategy but ND on another. The framework provides a 
systematic way of assembling a comprehensive picture of courts’ deferential outlook. Also, 
breaking down each unit of analysis by strategy of deference facilitates the detection of 
inconsistencies in judicial attitudes. For example, looking at the COA column, we can see 
that even when the same right is involved, say the right to education, the cogency of 
arguments demanded by the court varies. Further, the table allows us to compare the levels of 
deference across cases and within a case. 
These illustrative units are not a representative sample of all HRA cases and cannot be 
used to distill patterns in judicial attitudes. Such distillation, however, would be possible if 
the framework were applied to a large-scale study. At the time of writing, the framework is 
being applied to a study of human rights judgments handed down by the courts of Hong Kong 
since the territory’s return to Chinese sovereignty. That study is still underway, and its full 
and final results will be reported in a separate paper. My aim here is to use some preliminary 
results from the study to highlight the kinds of findings that a quantitative use of the 
framework can yield. 
In the period under study (1997-2014), 131 cases (broken down into 385 units of 
analysis) in which a measure was challenged for violating a right to which the proportionality 
test applies were identified. Each unit of analysis has been coded with strategy of deference 
scores, a unit deference score, and the following variables. 
- Year of judgment  
- Date of judgment 
- Court 
- Type of decision being challenged101 
- Judge 
- Judicial era102  
- Presence of dissenting judgment (yes or no) 
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- Category of rights103 
- Moral controversy (yes or no) 
- Political sensitivity (yes or no) 
- Allocation of scarce resources (yes or no) 
- Substantial financial implications on government (yes or no) 
- Immigration control (yes, non-residents; yes, residents; no) 
- Related to election or development of political parties (yes or no) 
- Number of judicial review applications for the year in question 
- Number of judicial review applications for previous year 
- Outcome in that particular unit of analysis (for or against the government or partial)  
The following variables have been coded for specific types of rights. 
- Seriousness of the allegation or interest at stake (high or low)104 
- Presence of an identified vulnerable minority (yes or no)105 
- Political expression, commercial expression or neither106  
- Whether case was handed down before or after HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai107  
- Whether case was handed down before or after Lam Siu Po v Commissioner of 
Police
108
  
These variables have been defined, and a scheme for coding them has been developed. The 
choice of variables to be coded should be determined by the hypotheses that the researcher 
wishes to test. The above-cited variables have been chosen to test certain assumptions about 
the deferential behaviour of the Hong Kong courts, such as that certain judges are more 
deferential than others; that certain types of decisions attract more deference than others; that 
courts are more deferential when a case involves a moral controversy, the allocation of scarce 
resources, or is politically sensitive; that the courts are more deferential when more judicial 
challenges against the government have been brought; and that certain landmark cases have 
an impact on the level of deference in subsequent cases. 
To test the effects of multiple variables on the level of deference, multiple regression 
analysis can be conducted using the unit deference score as the dependent variable and the 
factors to be tested as the independent variables. See Column A of Table III that presents the 
                                                 
103
 Access to court; equality; expression, assembly and association; fair hearing; legal representation; movement; 
political participation; presumption of innocence; privacy; property; welfare, occupation and family. 
104
 Coded for units on access to court, fair hearing, legal representation, and presumption of innocence. 
105
 Coded for units on equality. 
106 
Coded for units on expression, assembly and association. 
107 
[2006] 3 HKLRD 808. Coded for units on presumption of innocence. 
108
 [2009] 4 HKLRD 575. Coded for units on legal representation. 
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preliminary results of a multiple regression analysis using SPSS.
109
 Only variables that are 
statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level are shown.
110
 The coefficient indicates the change 
in the expected unit deference score (with 0 as the least deferential score and 1 as the most) 
when an independent variable is present, holding other variables constant. Positive 
coefficients indicate that the presence of the factor in question renders a court more 
deferential, whereas negative coefficients indicate that its presence renders a court less 
deferential. These results enable us to conclude that the presence of certain factors renders a 
unit more or less deferential and to determine the relative force of those factors. For example, 
they show that in freedom of expression cases, the courts are considerably less deferential 
when commercial expression is at stake. The findings also tell us that if the decision under 
challenge is a policy or individual decision by the executive, involves rights to political 
participation or a moral controversy, or attracts a dissenting judgment, the courts are less 
deferential, although the anti-deference force of these factors is not as great as that of 
commercial expression. The presence of immigration concerns regarding non-residents, when 
combined with the presence of welfare, occupation and family rights, renders a unit 
significantly more deferential. If the decision at issue is made by a professional body, 
involves welfare, occupation and family rights or (non-commercial and non-political) 
expression rights, or is politically sensitive, the courts are also more deferential. Other factors 
that render a court more deferential include the decision under challenge involving an 
allocation of scarce resources or being primary legislation, although their deferential force is 
not as great as the factors just named. And so on and so forth. These results enable 
researchers to test various hypotheses concerning deference. For example, they show that the 
assumption that politically sensitive cases attract greater deference is founded, whereas the 
assumption that a moral controversy does so is not – in fact, the courts are found to be less 
deferential when the case involves such a controversy. 
Because of methodological limitations the results cannot be used to draw comparisons 
with mathematical precision (e.g., to conclude that the deferential impact of a decision being 
that of a professional body is 2.187 times that of it being primary legislation). However, there 
is no need to draw comparisons with such precision. 
To test how sensitive the results are to the assigned values, sensitivity analyses have 
been conducted using 0.4 and 0.6 as the respective values for MD. Columns B and C of Table 
                                                 
109
 Regarding the “judges” variable, only judges with 10 or more data points were included in the regression. 
110
 The variable “number of judicial review applications for the previous year” is also omitted from the table. 
Although it is statistically significant, its coefficient (-0.001) is negligible. 
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III present the results of these analyses. Unsurprisingly, the list of statistically significant 
variables and their relative impact do not change much. Compared with the results of the 0.5 
analysis, the only discrepancies are as follows. 1) “Seriousness of allegation” in “fair 
hearing” and “presumption of innocence” cases appear statistically significant only in the 0.4 
and 0.6 analyses, respectively, and 2) there are slight changes in the relative force of the 
factors marked with an asterisk in those analyses. These tests demonstrate two points. First, 
most of the obtained results are not sensitive to slight changes in the values. Second, it is 
possible for researchers to enhance the rigour of the study by running sensitivity tests using 
neighbouring values and counting as significant only those variables that are revealed as 
significant across different values. All in all, for the purpose of obtaining meaningful 
comparisons of deference, it suffices to assign approximate values; it is unnecessary to pin 
down the ordinal categories with exact numerical precision. 
 
Table III. Comparison of regressions with different MD values 
 A B C 
Value of MD 0.5 0.4 0.6 
Independent variable Coefficient 
Commercial expression (for cases  on Freedom of expression, assembly 
and association) -0.697 -0.700 -0.744 
Type of decision: Policy -0.299 -0.297 -0.319 
Type of decision: Individual decision of the executive -0.280 -0.283 -0.301 
Category of right: Political participation  -0.176 -0.173 -0.195 
Moral controversy -0.160 -0.151 -0.182 
Presence of dissenting judgment -0.128 -0.131 -0.140 
Type of decision: Act of the police -0.115 -0.101* -0.132 
Post-Lam Kwong Wai (for cases on right to presumption of innocence) -0.112 -0.105* -0.116 
Judge: Ma -0.095 -0.094 -0.096 
Judge: Bokhary -0.092 -0.092 -0.092 
Seriousness of allegation (for cases on fair hearing) NS  -0.073 NS 
Seriousness of allegation (for cases on right to access to court) -0.064 -0.068 -0.074 
Seriousness of allegation (for cases on presumption of innocence) NS NS -0.056 
Type of decision: Primary legislation 0.107 0.104 0.108 
Allocation of scarce resources 0.163 0.154 0.165 
Category of right: Property 0.178 0.175 0.170 
Political sensitivity  0.264 0.276 0.253 
Category of right: Expression, assembly and association (when neither 
commercial nor political expression is involved) 0.319 0.313 0.352* 
Category of right: Welfare, occupation and family 0.331 0.330 0.331 
Type of decision: Decision of a professional body 0.341 0.351 0.327* 
Immigration concerns regarding non-residents + welfare, occupation and 
family rights 0.782 0.786 0.777 
“NS” denotes not significant at the p < 0.05 level 
*ranking of coefficient different from that in the 0.5 analysis  
0.5 analysis - R
2
: 0.526   Constant: 0.296 
0.4 analysis - R
2
: 0.517   Constant: 0.278 
0.6 analysis - R
2
: 0.535   Constant: 0.317 
 
(2016) 14(4) International Journal of Constitutional Law 851-882 
 
37 
 
None of these findings could be produced from purely qualitative analyses of deference. The 
results of a quantitative study based on the proposed framework would enhance our 
understanding of the courts’ approaches to deference and enable predictions of judicial 
behaviour. In addition, they imbue the oft-made descriptive statements and normative 
evaluations of existing approaches to deference with an empirical underpinning. Before we 
can say that courts are particularly deferential when dealing with morally controversial 
matters, and that as guardians of minority rights it is inappropriate for them to so defer, it is 
first necessary to determine whether the courts are indeed more deferential in adjudicating 
such matters. Findings resulting from use of the proposed framework would furnish a much-
needed systematic empirical foundation for testing assumptions about deferential behaviour. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper outlines a preliminary framework for measuring judicial deference in rights 
reasoning in common law jurisdictions. It is hoped that the framework will facilitate 
evaluations of how deferential courts are in rights adjudication – evaluations that scholars 
frequently make – and lay a methodological foundation for quantitative studies of judicial 
deference, ultimately enhancing our understanding of this increasingly important 
phenomenon. The framework is “open to and indeed, cries out for further refinement.”111 At 
the very least, it is hoped that the paper provides the impetus for discourse on the important 
but neglected issue of how to determine the degree of deference in rights reasoning. 
                                                 
111
 Canon, supra note 26, at 414. 
